Rustam Romaniuc, chargé de recherche à l’Anthropolab a publié un article avec Katherine Farrow, dans la revue scientifique International review of law and economics (Volume 56, December 2018)

Résumé de la publication (en anglais)


•We study the effects of a formal rule on informal norms enforced by two mechanisms.
•Anonymous peer disapproval is no longer effective after a formal rule is removed.
•Saving-face, in contrast, continues to be an effective form of norm enforcement.
•Image concerns therefore appear more resilient than anonymous peer disapproval.
•Leveraging image concerns can be a way to foster robust informal norms.


In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.

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