Rustam Romaniuc, chargé de recherche à l’Anthropolab a publié un article avec Katherine Farrow, dans la revue scientifique International review of law and economics (Volume 56, December 2018)
Résumé de la publication (en anglais)
Highlights
- •We study the effects of a formal rule on informal norms enforced by two mechanisms.
- •Anonymous peer disapproval is no longer effective after a formal rule is removed.
- •Saving-face, in contrast, continues to be an effective form of norm enforcement.
- •Image concerns therefore appear more resilient than anonymous peer disapproval.
- •Leveraging image concerns can be a way to foster robust informal norms.
Abstract
In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.
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